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Abstract
The Shuttle Program has experienced numerous launch delays over the
15-year history of launch operations. This paper presents  a
comprehensive tabulation of those delays along with descriptive data
covering launch attempts, system/subsystem involved and a  b r i e f
discussion of the cause of the each delay. This historical data has been
audited against NASA/JSC flight history and current records at KSC. Both
number of occurrences and magnitude of each launch delay are
summarized in a database format allowing analysis, sorting by system o r
Orbiter vehicle and chronological assessment. Trends in launch delays
since return to flight and comparisons with expendable launch vehicle data
are presented. A special sort is described summarizing the propulsion
system delays over the history of the program. This particular analysis
has application to the new X-33 / Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Program
due to the universal selection of L02/ L H2 engines for all RLV designs.
Significant lessons learned from these launch delay data are presented for
comparison with the optimistic turnaround projections for X-33 and RLV.
Database Description
The STS Launch Delays Database contains all launch delays encountered
from STS-1 to date including the “original manifest” launch date and all
delays from that date to the actual launch date for each mission. The data
is arranged in an Excel 5.0 spreadsheet and contains approximately 250
entries.
Detailed data on each delay entry includes: Mission, launch sequence, delay
number, Orbiter Vehicle, OV-flight number, date, delay magnitude (days,
hours, minutes, seconds). For each entry the system and subsystem
causing the delay and a brief description of the cause are presented.
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The basic groundrules used to define a delay include all delays causing a
change or slip in the planned launch date or time. Of particular interest
are those delays of one day or more which are the central focus of this
analysis. Delays caused by schedule remanifesting or flight-to-flight
delays are accounted for but are set aside for vehicle systems evaluations.
All data has been cross-checked against the Space Shuttle Mission Reports
published by the Johnson Space Center and the Space Shuttle Launch
Schedule and Planning Manifest maintained by the Kennedy Space Center.
These sources are referred to often to confirm data accuracy.
Summary Chart Observations
Delays data sorted by major system are summarized in Fig 1. It is easily
seen that the delays due to 5lL (Challenger) are so large as to cause trend
distortion. Therefore the 2 years and 8 months required to return to flight
(including major mods to all Orbiters) are shown here but discarded for
evaluation purposes.
Looking now at the remaining program delays of one day or more, we find
that a large portion, 58%, were due to delays in the liquid propulsion area
(including hydrogen leaks, MPS, OMS/RCS and SSME). And, 60% of this
portion is due to the SSME only. Please note the distinction between
number of delays and magnitude of delays. The band along the bottom of
the chart carries the number of delays in each system, the height of each
bar indicates the cumulative magnitude in days of delay for each s y stem
over the program history. The high occurrence and magnitude of
propulsion and engine delays does not bode well for the planned RLV
program. (Note: All three contractors, seeking high Isp, have selected
L 02/LH2 propellants / engines.) Also, notice the weather delays data.
Weather has 22 occurrences, but only a magnitude of 30 days, yielding a n
average of 1.36 days. All other system delays average 12.58 days p e r
delay. This is not surprising for Florida weather; where they say: “If you
don’t like today’s weater, just wait
hour scrub turnarounds” on the Shu
the average propulsion delay is 21.4
indicates 99 total delays with a
Additional summarizing data is sho
till tomorrow.” We’ve had many “24-
tle program. By the way, please note:
days, a system record. Summary data
cumulative magnitude of 999 days.
wn in Fig. 1; for example, it took 124
“attempts” to launch 73 missions, an average of 1.7 attempts per launch.
(Note: During 1993 that average was 2.4 attempts per launch.) For our
purposes an “attempt” consisted of all launch counts which reached the “go
for cryo load” point, about T-6 hours.
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Figure 1 - Shuttle Launch Delays Summary By System
Propulsion System Analysis
Propulsion system delays dominate the system sort, including H2 leaks,
when, sometimes, the source of the leak was unknown. This situation
caused the summer of 1990 to be a long season when this problem
affected more than a single vehicle. Also, Fig. 2 shows the 12-year history
of cumulative SSME launch delays. A curious “bathtub” curve seems to
emerge, indicating that we are dealing with more than simple “infant
mortality” in the early years. The on-pad aborts of 1993 show their
presence. It should be noted that many of these delays were brought
about by failures in the instrumentation systems, not flight hardware
failures. So, beware the thinking that a vehicle health management system
for the next generation launcher is going to be the panacea for all
propulsion problems. Instrumentation failures will continue, so number
and placement of instrumentation must be judicious to enhance, not to
impeed new vehicle operations.
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Figure 2 - SSME Delays by Year
Sorts by Orbiter
A sort of the database by orbiter vehicle was performed to determine if a
correlation could be made of delays per launch with the build date (i.e., is a
learning curve present?). Figure 3 is a plot of delays by orbiter vehicle
number. With the exception of OV 102 (Columbia, our oldest orbiter) we
find a direct relationship between number of flights and number of delays,
independent of the build date. Could it be that, for Columbia, we are
seeing a greater number of delays per launch due to aging effects, and the
other three vehicles (not yet to this age) have a linear relationship
between number of launches and number of delays? However when
weather delays are subtracted from the effects, the variations are not as
linear (see Fig. 4). OV 103 is 1.0 delay per launch, OV 104 is the lowest a t
0.73, OV 099 is 1.1, and OV 105 is 0.89.
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Figure 4 - Launch Delays by Orbiter Vehicle - w/o Weather
Launch Windows
The Shuttle’s recent missions to MIR have raised the issue of probability of
launch within a limited (5 minute) window. Based on data made available
in the Orlando Sentinel I have compiled the chart shown in Fig. 5. As y o u
can see, this data presents the number of missions launched on the first,
second, etc. attempts as of January 1995 and the fraction of each that was
launched within the first 5 minutes of the launch window. Looking at total
attempts, we see that 32.5% were within the first 5 minutes and looking a t
only the first attempts for each of the 66 missions only 27% were within
the first 5 minutes. This does not bode well for the upcoming ISSA
missions, all of which have a 5-minute window due to the orbital plane
change required to achieve the 51.6 degrees orbit. However, added built-
in hold time prior to launch may help improve the success rate.
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Figure 5 - Shuttle Launch Windows Record
Comparisons with ELV Delays
When we compare existing Shuttle delays with those experienced in the
expendable launch fleet (Delta, Titan and Atlas) we see similar patterns.
The ELV data used here is taken from the reports presented to the
Moorman Panel on Launch Modernization. Figure 6 illustrates a typical
comparison. These data are formatted as “average number of delays per
flight” and “average delay time per flight”. Some vary as to sample size,
for example, a large Titan 11/111 sample (151 flights-many at Vandenberg)
while the Atlas data is for only 13 flights. No explanation of these
variations is given in the subject report. As can be seen here, Shuttle (the
only manned and reusable vehicle) performed competitively with both
Delta and Titan 11/111, and, for the sample illustrated, bested Atlas. Direct
comparisons with Titan IV do not require comment. An interesting
additional comparison was made in the Moorman Report, “Nominal
Processing Time”. These timelines were subsequently analyzed for “Time
off-Pad” and “Time on-Pad”. Here again, as shown in Fig. 7, Shuttle data
compares very competitively, considering the manned and reusable
aspects.
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Figure 6 - Launch Vehicle Delays Summary
Based on STS CY91 - CY94
(As of June 1994) -24 Flights
* Includes Orbiter Processing
I
t
Figure 7 - Launch Vehicle On-Pad and Off-Pad Timelines
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Lessons for X-33/RLV
The key messages for the vehicle and operational designs of X-33 and later
RLV can be deduced from this, the only reusable space vehicle experience.
Those key message are summarized here as follows:
1) L02/ L H2 propulsion, its instrumentation and the control of H2
leaks must receive major re-thinking for RLV. Unless significant gains can
be assured in component reliability, maintenance requirements and
robustness, “we’ll get what we’ve always got” (no matter how well we meet
mass fraction criteria).
2) Launch delays will occur with RLV, the question is: What
systems, what reliability values and what new designs should we invest in
to achieve the RLV goals? Some feel that a comprehensive vehicle health
management system will, somehow, be our panacea. They could be wrong.
Many of our current problem reports revolve around instrumentation and
wiring systems. Therefore, a major improvement in the rel
ancillary systems is required, as well.
3) RLV should, by all accounts, be more tolerant of
than Shuttle. It will have no transatlantic landing sites a
iability of these
weather delays
nd abort modes
that are keyed on “abort-to-orbit”. It should have potentially higher cross-
wind landing capability by design to cope with landing delays.
4) Since the causes of most delays are in systems which are also the
major timeline hitters, it is hopeful that improved turnaround times will
result in improved resistance to launch delays. However, since most of the
current RLV turnaround assessments are based only on predicted
reliability values, the derived improvements are by no means certain.
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